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Abstract 
The importance of economics to the analysis and enforcement of competition policy and 
law has increased tremendously in the developed market economies in the past forty 
years.  In younger and developing market economies, competition law itself has a 
history of twenty to twenty-five years at most – sometimes much less – and economic 
tools that have proven useful to competition law enforcement in developed market 
economies in focusing investigations and in assisting decision makers in distinguishing 
central from secondary issues are inevitably less well understood.  This paper presents a 
non-technical introduction to three economic tools that have become widespread in 
competition law enforcement in general and in the analysis of proposed mergers in 
particular:  critical loss analysis, upward pricing pressure, and the vertical arithmetic.   
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1.  Introduction 
The importance of economics to the analysis and enforcement of competition 
policy and law has increased tremendously in the developed market economies in the 
past forty years.  In younger and developing market economies, competition law itself 
has a history of twenty to twenty-five years at most – sometimes much less – and 
economic tools that have proven useful to competition law enforcement in developed 
market economies in focusing investigations and in assisting decision makers in 
distinguishing central from secondary issues are inevitably less well understood.  While 
agencies and enforcers face a steep learning curve regarding these tools, companies and 
their attorneys and economic consultants are already using them to present agencies 
with sophisticated economic analyses purporting to demonstrate the lack of cause for 
concern regarding particular deals or practices. 
This paper presents a non-technical introduction to three economic tools that 
have become widespread in competition law enforcement in general and in the analysis 
of proposed mergers in particular:  critical loss analysis, upward pricing pressure, and 
the vertical arithmetic.  The first is used primarily in the context of horizontal mergers 
for both market definition and the analysis of potential competitive effects from the 
merger, while the second and third are used primarily in the analysis of potential 
competitive effects, the second in horizontal mergers and the third in vertical mergers.  
All three are discussed extensively by now in the economics and legal literature, so that 
an introduction inevitably gives inadequate attention to some corollaries and 
complexities. 
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2.  Critical Loss Analysis 
 Critical Loss Analysis (CLA) was introduced in 1989 (Harris and Simons, 1989) 
primarily as a tool for market definition in merger investigations and has been used 
extensively since then in the analysis of both product markets and geographic markets.  
Subsequently it began to be applied, with appropriate amendments, to the analysis of 
competitive effects of mergers as well, with a focus on the analysis of the unilateral 
effects of mergers in markets with differentiated products.  We will consider the two 
applications in that order. 
2.1  Critical Loss Analysis for Market Definition 
 The standard methodology for market definition in merger analysis begins with 
the “hypothetical monopolist test”:  whether “a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not 
subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of … [a set of 
products] likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase 
in price (‘SSNIP’) on at least one product in the market …”  (U.S. Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission, 2010).  Even the broad implementation of this test 
requires the analyst to make a number of detailed choices and assumptions – some of 
which will be considered later – but for now let us make the exercise more 
straightforward by assuming that the hypothetical monopolist is restricted to charging a 
single price to all potential customers.  (Note that this is a conservative assumption, in 
that it renders the analysis less likely to satisfy the test, since we are restricting the 
ability of the hypothetical monopolist to set the prices of each good at its profit-
maximizing level.) 
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 Algebraically, we assume that industry profits are currently set as: 
(1)     Π0 = (P0 – C)Q0 
where fixed costs are assumed sunk and irrelevant in the short term and marginal costs 
C are assumed constant.  The hypothetical monopolist of the industry would consider 
increasing price according to the following equation: 
(2)    Π1 = (P0 + ΔP – C)(Q0 - ΔQ) 
and the critical issue is: 
(3)   (P0 + ΔP – C)(Q0 - ΔQ) ≷  (P0 – C)Q0 
Does the increase in profit from the price increase ΔP on the sales that remain outweigh 
the reduction in profit resulting from the loss of sales ΔQ?  Simple algebra reveals the 
“critical loss” of output that would make the monopolist indifferent: 
(4) 
 
where M = (P0 – C)/P0, the existing price-cost margin.  If the loss of sales ΔQ resulting 
from the increase in price ΔP is higher than that which satisfies this equation, the price 
increase would not be profitable. 
 Of course, if we knew the elasticity of demand for the product, we would know 
the ΔQ/Q that would result from a given ΔP/P, and no further analysis would be 
required to answer the market definition question.  But let’s assume that we are early in 
an investigation, without the data required for estimating such a parameter.  Then the 
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critical loss calculation described above serves to frame a very specific question:  if price 
increases by a certain amount, how much would demand fall?  And in particular, where 
would it “go”?  Or, in the language of the CLA literature, now that we know the “critical 
loss”, what would be the “actual loss”? 
 Consider a hypothetical merger investigation, and the information that might be 
available early in the investigation to the analyst at the antimonopoly agency seeking to 
answer the market definition question.1  Suppose that the analyst has the following 
information, considered inexact but reasonably reliable. 
Firm Current output Capacity Price Variable cost 
W 100 105 $50 $30 
X 80 85 $50 $30 
Y 33 50 $50 ? 
Z 30 ? $50 ? 
Table 1.  A 4-firm provisional market 
Now suppose that firms W and X propose to merge, and our analyst wants first 
to analyze whether the product sold by these firms constitutes a relevant product 
market.  Using the hypothetical monopolist test along with CLA, the question may be 
formulated as follows:  would a hypothetical monopolist of this product raise prices by a 
SSNIP, say 5%? 
Using the prices and costs of the merging firms shown in Table 1, and assuming 
that these represent the prices and costs of a hypothetical monopolist, we see that a 
                                                     
1 Examples of the use of critical loss analysis in US and EC merger investigations are presented in 
Langenfeld and Li (2001), Amelio, et al. (2008), and Hüschelrath (2009). 
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price increase of 5% would equal $2.50, so that the monopolist would gain $2.50 on 
each unit still sold, but would lose $50 - $30 = $20 on each unit sale lost.  Thus ΔP/P = 
5% and M = $20/$50 = 40%.  Then the critical loss for determining whether the price 
increase would be profitable is ΔQ/Q = 5/(40 + 5) = 1/9 =11%. We therefore have the 
following question to investigate:  if a hypothetical monopolist provider of this product 
raised price from $50 to $52.50, would sales be reduced by as much as 11%?  And in 
particular – focusing on the demand side, as is the practice in US enforcement – to what 
other products might consumers of these products switch? 
 The relevant product market question asks to what degree customers will 
substitute away from the product in response to the price increase.    Are there other 
products that are imperfect substitutes for this product but would become more 
attractive following a price increase?  If the product is a consumer good, are consumers 
likely to be highly sensitive to price increases and to reduce their purchases of this good, 
allocating more of their budgets to other consumer goods, whether close substitute 
goods or unrelated goods?  If the product is a producer good, are the firms that use this 
product as an input into the production of other goods able to substitute other inputs in 
the production process, and/or will they suffer their own losses of sales if forced to 
“pass through” this price increase of an input? 
   This is the basic version of CLA.  It does no more and no less than focus the 
attention of the analyst on the precise (or somewhat precise, as we will discuss) 
question of how much substitution away from the products in the provisional product 
market would be necessary to defeat a potential anticompetitive price increase, and 
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thus whether this choice of provisional product market represents the state of 
competition in the world as it exists or whether the provisional product market must be 
expanded to include the next closest substitute to constitute an actual market.   
Once having identified the relevant product, a similar analysis would be 
applicable to the definition of geographic markets.  To test whether the area that 
includes only the four firms in Table 1 is a relevant geographic market, for example, 
observe that the critical loss of 11% of their collective sales of 243 units is 27 units. If the 
hypothetical monopolist that raises price from $50 to $52.50 would lose sales of fewer 
than 27 units to producers outside of that area, the test is satisfied. If it would lose more 
than 27 sales, the area must be expanded to include those rivals to which purchasers 
switched.  A number of variations and complications to this simple story should be 
considered. 
2.1.1  Implicit elasticities 
 In practice, the merging parties (and/or their lawyers and consultants) may argue 
that existing price-cost margins that look “high” suggest that a hypothetical monopolist 
would be unlikely to raise price much from its current level; after all, the argument may 
go, each unit lost in a reduction of output loses the entire existing margin -- $20 in our 
example – and the hypothetical monopolist would have to lose only a small amount of 
sales in order to regret its decision to impose a SSNIP. 
However, as a theoretical matter, as Katz and Shapiro (2003) and Kaplow and 
Shapiro (2007), among others, have pointed out, the estimated price-cost margin 
contains information about the elasticity of demand facing the firms in the industry.  
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According to the well known Lerner Index, a profit-maximizing firm sets price where the 
price-cost margin equals the negative reciprocal of the elasticity of demand that it faces.  
In our example, the existing firms are earning profits of 40 percent, which implies a firm-
level demand elasticity of -2.5.  Industry-level demand elasticities are by definition 
smaller (in absolute value) than the firm-level demand elasticities of which they are 
made up.  Thus a high operating margin, which implies a critical loss sufficiently small 
that merging firms may argue that it is unlikely to be realized, at the same time implies a 
small actual loss, since only firms facing an inelastic demand curve could set prices and 
margins so high.  As Katz and Shapiro (2003) summarize it, “A high gross margin implies 
a small critical loss.  But a high gross margin also tends to indicate a small actual loss.” 
2.1.2  Cost estimates:  Marginal vs. Variable, Constant vs. Fixed 
The profit maximization derivations on which both the CLA and the Lerner Index 
are based use the margin between price (or sometimes marginal revenue) and marginal 
cost to analyze the incentives of either individual firms or the hypothetical monopolist.  
In general, however, business firms do not calculate “marginal cost” in the ordinary 
course of business; rather, they usually calculate “variable cost”, and though empirical 
analysts often use the latter as a proxy for the former, there are good reasons, both 
conceptual and practical, why the two are not likely to be identical. 
First of all, from a pure measurement standpoint, Fisher and McGowan (1983) 
and Fisher (1987) demonstrate just how different the accountants’ treatment of factors 
such as advertising, research and development, and other costs can be from the 
economists’ definitions. 
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Second, and more conceptually, as noted by Carlton and Perloff (2005) and 
Pittman (2009), true marginal cost as the first derivative of total cost includes at least 
implicitly a rental value of capital, and this term may become especially important as 
firm and/or industry production approaches capacity.  An inquiry into the likely effect of 
a SSNIP that does not factor in the possibility of a rising marginal cost curve – which of 
course we observe in any intermediate microeconomics text – may underestimate the 
attractiveness to the firm of reducing output, and therefore too quickly reject the 
proposition that a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to increase price and 
reduce output.  Simons and Coate (2014) argue the related point that firms making 
decisions regarding profit maximization in the long term will not generally base their 
thinking on short run marginal costs, even if measured accurately. 
Werden (2005) and Baumann and Godek (2009) also note that the issue is 
broader than just the distinction between (theoretical) marginal and (measured) 
variable cost.  Even if marginal cost is measured accurately, by variable cost or 
otherwise, the assumption that it is constant over the range of output choices of firms 
and the hypothetical monopolist may need to be examined.  Approaching capacity 
limitations may be one factor; another may be differences in costs across firms, such 
that the hypothetical monopolist might not only raise price but also reduce output 
asymmetrically, focusing on cancelling production shifts at more expensive plants or 
even closing them down.  To the extent that these complications lead the analyst to 
underestimate the marginal cost savings of lost sales, a price increase by the 
hypothetical monopolist will appear less profitable.  
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2.1.3  The SSNIP 
 As emphasized by Werden (2005, 2008), the details of the assumption of a SSNIP 
as usually practiced in the market definition exercise may be misleading in at least two 
ways, and these two may interact.  First, the Guidelines ask whether a hypothetical 
monopolist would likely impose a SSNIP – a profit maximization question – whereas the 
more common practice is to analyze whether the hypothetical monopolist could 
profitably impose a SSNIP – a break-even analysis.  The latter interpretation has the 
distinct advantage of not requiring the analyst to make assumptions about the shape of 
the demand curve in the industry (Langenfeld and Li, 2001), but it may affect the 
conclusion nonetheless. 
 In particular, a break-even analysis of a “small” price increase – say 5% or 10%, 
the usual choices – may miss the possibility that a firm or hypothetical monopolist facing 
customers with varying elasticities of demand might find it unprofitable to raise price by 
a small amount that keeps most customers in the market regardless of their elasticity of 
demand, but find it profitable to raise price a great deal more such that elastic 
demanders are priced out of the market while inelastic demanders pay the higher prices 
(Werden, 2005, 2008).   Rejecting the profitability of a small price increase can lead to a 
decision to expand the size of the provisional market, when examining the profitability 
of a larger price increase might lead to the conclusion that the original provisional 
market was correct after all. 
 The analyst who finds that the application of a break-even SSNIP leads to a 
rejection of the provisional market definition may therefore want to check the 
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robustness of this result by asking whether there are customers of the product with 
significantly different elasticities of demand.  Are there  customers with demand so 
inelastic that selling to them only, at an even higher price, would be a profitable strategy 
for the hypothetical monopolist?  At this point, of course, one is moving away from the 
appealing simplicity of the break-even test. 
2.1.4  Market definition is not the whole story 
 It perhaps goes without saying – but we will say it – that market definition is not 
the whole story in merger analysis.  In particular, market definition, especially as 
practiced in the US, is focused on the demand side – purchaser preferences and 
switching behavior.  But in many investigations the supply side – including the strategic 
responses of rival firms - may also be important.  In EU practice some of this supply-side 
analysis is included in the market definition exercise, while in US practice most of it is 
subsumed under the rubric of the potential for entry by other firms into the product and 
geographic market.2 
 In our example, on the supply side the analyst would be asking questions like the 
following:  Are there producers outside of the market that might reposition themselves 
(either in product or geographic space) such that customers could easily switch to new 
suppliers without losing much in the way of either utility or efficiency?  Are imports 
                                                     
2 See the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission, August 19, 2010, at §4:  “Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution 
factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to another in 
response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product 
quality or service. The responsive actions of suppliers are also important in competitive analysis. 
They are considered in these Guidelines in the sections addressing the identification of market 
participants, the measurement of market shares, the analysis of competitive effects, and entry.”  
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(from other domestic geographic areas or from foreign companies) poised to enter the 
market, and are there good reasons like transportation costs, tariffs, or quotas that 
would limit the scope or scale of their entry?    If these imported products are not being 
purchased by customers now, there may be good reasons why they would remain 
unpurchased even following a SSNIP. 
2.2  Critical Loss Analysis for Unilateral Effects Analysis 
 CLA is used not only in market definition but also in competitive effects (and 
especially unilateral effects) analysis.  In this case the algebra of the derivation of the 
critical loss becomes a bit more complicated, and the introduction of an important new 
term is required. 
 In particular, let us return to the industry setting of Table 1, but now instead of 
analyzing whether it would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist of the entire 
industry to increase price by a SSNIP, we analyze whether the merger of two firms, say 
firms W and X, would provide the merged firm with the unilateral incentive to increase 
its own price only.  We will simplify the analysis by considering the question of whether 
it would be profitable to increase the price of the good produced by firm W only; clearly 
the merged firm would consider the profitability of increasing the price of both goods. 
 Before the merger, firm W sets prices according to the same profit-maximization 
principles as the hypothetical monopolist, according to equations (1) – (4), above.  
Prices were increased until just the point at which the loss in sales – both to other firms 
in the market and to the rest of the economy – outweighed the benefits of higher 
prices.  After the merger, however, some of the losses from a price increase for the 
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product of firm W are newly internalized by the firm – they are “recaptured” by firm X, 
now under the same control as firm W.  Thus we have a new factor in the calculations, 
the diversion ratio DWX, the share of the sales of W that are lost as the result of a price 
increase for W that are “recaptured” by firm X (Willig, 1991; Shapiro, 1996, 2010). 
 Thus the profit-maximization question facing the merged firm as it considers 
whether and by how much to raise the price of good W is now: 
(5)     (PW + ΔPW – CW)(QW – ΔQW) + (PX – CX)(QX + ΔQWDWX) ≷  (PW – CW)QW + (PX – CX)QX 
where ΔQWDWX = ΔQX. 
As with equations (3) and (4), this translates into the critical loss of quantity W for the 
merged firm to raise price on good W (Langenfeld and Li, 2001; Hüschelrath, 2009): 
(6)  ΔQW/QW ≷ (ΔPW/PW)/[(PW – CW) + (ΔPW/PW) – (PX – CX)(PX/PW)DWX] 
Comparing equation (4) – as interpreted for a single profit-maximizing firm premerger – 
and equation (6) – the calculation for the firm after merging with a competitor – shows 
that the difference is the last term in the denominator on the right-hand-side – and that 
because this is the subtraction of the product of three positive terms, it will tend to 
increase the size of the critical loss that would make a price increase unprofitable.  Note 
also something that we will return to in the next section:  the increase in the critical loss 
for good W following the merger – and thus the increase in the incentive of its producer 
to increase price – is a positive function of a) the margin earned on the second good X, 
b) the ratio of the price of the second good X to the first good W, and c) the diversion 
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ration of W to X – the percentage of sales of good W lost by a price increase that are 
recaptured by good X, now owned by the same firm. 
3.  Upward Pricing Pressure 
Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) might be considered a first cousin to the use of 
critical loss in the analysis of the unilateral effects of a proposed merger, with, among 
other wrinkles, a more direct focus on the potential efficiencies of the proposed merger 
and whether they are likely to outweigh the loss of competition in the price-setting of 
the merged firm. 
In the previous section of the paper, we abstracted from the distinction between 
homogeneous and differentiated products, assuming that all firms charged the same 
price but that a single firm had the option to charge a different price.  In this section we 
abandon this abstraction and embrace the distinction between these two types of 
goods that was such an important part of the revised Merger Guidelines in 1992.  As 
Shapiro (2010) discusses at length, while the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines focused on the 
danger that a merger among competitors would increase the likelihood of collusion – 
either explicit or tacit – in the more concentrated market, thus focusing implicitly on 
homogeneous products, the 1992 Guidelines added a second focus on the likelihood 
that a merger among competitors producing differentiated products would provide 
incentives for the merged firm to raise price unilaterally, regardless of the behavior of 
competitors in response. 
Thus a new emphasis was placed on the degree to which competing products 
were close or distant substitutes to each other – a concept implemented in the term 
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that we introduced in the previous section, the diversion ratio DWX between two firms W 
and X, the percentage of sales of good W lost in response to a price change for good W 
that are “diverted” to good X.  A larger value for this diversion ratio DWX clearly 
suggested a merger that would be more troublesome from a competitive standpoint, 
ceteris paribus. 
However, the 1992 Guidelines, along with the subsequent literature, 
simultaneously added a new focus on another term in the denominator of equation (6):  
the price-cost margin earned in the production of good X.  If this margin were “high”, 
especially vis-à-vis the margin earned in the production of good W, the merged firm 
would be quite happy for sales of W to be diverted to sales of X; not so much if the 
margin earned on the production of X were “low”.  Thus increased attention came to be 
focused on the product DWX(PX – CX), the value to the merged firm of sales of W that 
were diverted by the price increase for W to sales of X, a value termed the “Gross 
Upward Pricing Pressure Index” (GUPPI) from the merger (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010a; 
Moresi, 2010).  A corresponding term was calculated and considered for the merged 
firm’s incentive to increase the price of good X. 
3.1  How to Use GUPPI? 
But how are we to interpret and use GUPPI?  Any non-zero diversion from W to X 
accompanied by any non-zero margin on X would yield a positive value for GUPPI.  One 
option would be to proceed with the CLA described in section 1.2 above for the analysis 
of unilateral merger effects, plugging an estimated value for GUPPI into equation (6).  
Again, for an evaluation of the impact of the merger one would also perform the 
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exercise in reverse, analyzing the incentives created by the merger for a unilateral 
increase in the price of X, taking account of recapture in the sale of W through the 
corresponding diversion ratio DXW. 
A second option would be to use GUPPI directly to calculate the likely price 
impact of the merger directly, ignoring any possible efficiencies from the merger.  Farrell 
and Shapiro (2010b) and Hausman, et al. (2011) provide formulas for doing so that rely 
on the assumptions of a linear demand curve and symmetric cross-price elasticities of 
demand along with estimated values for six parameters:  the prices and margins for the 
two goods and the two diversion ratios. 
For good W, the post-merger profit-maximizing price change equals the 
following: 
(7) ΔPW/PW = [DWX(PX – CX) + DWXDXW(PW – CW)]/[2(1 – DWXDXW)PW] 
and correspondingly for good X.  Again, what the formula makes most clear is one of the 
most important additions of the 1992 Guidelines to the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines:  a 
significant incentive to increase price post-merger requires not only significant diversion 
ratios but also significant operating margins on the good or goods to which demand is 
diverted. 
Figure 1 shows makes this point graphically.  A price increase for the first good 
moves out the demand curve for the second good.  The “value of diverted sales” is the 
rectangle that represents the product of a) the volume of diversion from the first good 
to the second and b) the margin earned on the second.  Only if both the base and the 
height of the rectangle are of non-trivial magnitudes is the area of the rectangle “large”. 
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Figure 1.  Value of diverted sales 
 Finally, as demonstrated in Werden (1996), information on diversion ratios and 
margins may be used to estimate the merger-specific marginal cost reductions 
(“efficiencies”) that would be required to counterbalance the upward pricing pressure 
generated directly by the merger and so create a situation of unchanged pricing 
incentives for the merged firm. 
3.2.  GUPPI to UPP 
A cousin of GUPPI is UPP, Upward Pricing Pressure, which adds estimates of 
post-merger marginal cost savings to the GUPPI calculations in order to calculate a 
measure of the “net” (of claimed or predicted efficiencies) incentives for the merged 
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firm to increase prices.  As suggested by Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) and then presented 
explicitly by both Farrell and Shapiro (2010b) and Schmalensee (2010), requiring now 
not only the assumption of linear demand curves but also estimates for the product-
specific diversion ratios, prices and marginal costs, and claimed/predicted reductions in 
marginal cost, the formula for merger UPP for good W is as follows: 
(8) ΔPW/PW = {[2DWX(PX – CX) – EX(1 – (PX – CX)(DXW – DWX))](PX/PW) + DXW(DXW + 
DWX)(PW – CW) –EW[1 – (PW – CW))(2 – DXW(DWX + DXW)]}/[4 – (DXW + DWX)2] 
Again, there is a symmetric formula for the “upward pricing pressure” created by the 
merger for good X. 
3.3  The Diversion Ratio 
Of course a key requirement for making use of all these concepts is the 
estimation of diversion ratios.  Unlike prices and (variable if not marginal) costs, these 
are not to be found in the account books kept by the companies.  How, short of complex 
econometric estimation, might these be approximated by the competition agency 
analyst? 
A straightforward approach, often treated as a sort of default option, is to use 
the shares of competitors in a candidate or provisional market to estimate diversion 
ratios (Willig, 1991; Shapiro, 2010).  In our numerical example outlined above, if we 
consider firms W, X, Y, and Z as the competitors in our candidate market, firms X, Y, and 
Z have 56%, 23%, and 21% respectively of non-W sales.  Since these market shares 
reflect the preferences and choices of existing consumers in the market place, we might 
assume that those same preferences would drive diversion in these proportions in 
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reaction to a price increase on good W.  This approach is based on a number of  
assumptions (Willig, 1991; Rybnicek and Onken, 2016), including that we have an idea as 
to market definition – the latter a requirement that UPP analysis is designed in part to 
obviate (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010a). 
But there are often other good sources of information to guide the analyst in 
both evaluating the accuracy of market shares as indicators of diversion ratios and in 
judging how these estimates of diversion ratios might be adjusted to better reflect 
market realities.  As Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) note: 
The diversion ratio might be estimated using evidence generated in the merging 
firms’ normal course of business.  Firms often track diversion ratios in the form 
of who they are losing business to, or who they can win business from.  
Consumer surveys can also illuminate diversion ratios, as can information about 
customer switching patterns (p. 18, footnote omitted). 
In particular, interviews with, and documents supplied by, customers of the firms may 
yield subjective but informative information as to the particular qualities of 
differentiated products that make each a closer or more distant substitute for others as 
well as objective reports of past switching events and their rationales.  In the latter 
respect, “natural experiments” may be especially informative:  when product W became 
temporarily unavailable because of labor or transportation problems, what did its usual 
customers do in response?  These additional sources of information can allow the 
analyst to calculate diversion ratios from an independent source or to better evaluate 
the diversion ratios estimated via market shares.  
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Finally, any estimates based on the within-market shares of diverted sales may 
be tempered by the recognition that some of the demand for good W will leave the 
market entirely in response to a price increase – thus each firm-level estimate may be 
multiplied by a factor that reflects the “aggregate diversion ratio” – the fraction of the 
units that would be lost by an individual firm that are retained by the hypothetical 
monopolist” (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010b). 
3.4  The Limits of UPP and GUPPI 
As noted above, both UPP and GUPPI may be used as indicators of the degree of 
competition likely to be lost from a merger; to provide a forecast of post-merger price 
increases by the merged firm; or to calculate the magnitude of merger-induced 
“efficiencies” necessary to remove the incentive for price increases following the 
merger.  UPP and GUPPI, like critical loss analysis, are tools that focus attention on 
particular issues and factors that affect  the profitability of a price increase by either a 
hypothetical monopolist (in market definition) or the merged firm (in unilateral effects 
analysis).3 
That being said, it is also important to keep in mind that conclusions based on 
UPP and GUPPI – and CLA – are strongest when the analyst has also assessed the validity 
of the underlying assumptions as well as other questions not directly addressed by 
these tools.  As one important example, none of these takes account of the possibility of 
the reactions of other firms to the possible price changes imposed by the merged firm.  
Such reactions could render the proposed merger either more or less harmful to 
                                                     
3 Baltzopoulos, et al. (2015) discuss the use of UPP in five recent cases reviewed by Konkurrensverket, the 
Swedish Competition Authority. 
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competition and customers.  For example, if competitors “accommodated” post-merger 
price increases by increasing their own prices, the merger harm would be increased.  On 
the other hand, if competitors repositioned their products in order to be closer 
substitutes to the products of the merged firm, that could increase the diversion to 
rivals, reducing the incentive for price increases and the harm to competition from the 
merger (Pakes, 2010; Cheung, 2016).4 
4.  The Vertical Arithmetic 
Consider a proposed merger that is vertical rather than (or in addition to) 
horizontal.  Consider, for example, a proposal by a manufacturer to purchase its supplier 
of a crucial raw material.  How much should the antimonopoly agency be concerned 
about a loss to competition?  In particular – though, as we will discuss below, the 
problem is potentially more general – how much should the agency be concerned about 
the potential for post-merger anticompetitive “foreclosure” – that is, the denial of 
access to important inputs to competing manufacturers?5 
It is common in such a situation for competing manufacturers to contact the 
competition authority to express their concerns that if the raw material supplier comes 
under control of their manufacturing competitor, they will be discriminated against in 
supply in the future, whether with regard to price, service, or product availability.  The 
reply from the merging firms will likely be that they would only be hurting themselves 
                                                     
4 As Pakes (2010) also points out, there could also be post-merger repositioning by one or both of the 
merging firms, and this could either increase or decrease the harm to competition that would otherwise 
take place. 
5 Of course, a proposed vertical merger could also raise the possibility of the foreclosure of access to 
downstream customers from an upstream competitor – what Baker (2011) terms “customer foreclosure”.  
Or, as in the case analyzed by Baker, it could raise both issues simultaneously. 
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by treating a customer badly.  How is one to evaluate the tradeoff that would face the 
newly merged, vertically integrated firm? 
One analytical tool which could be presented to the competition authority by 
either party is a technique called the “vertical arithmetic” (Sibley and Doane, 2002; CRA, 
2005; Moresi and Salop, 2013).6  As with critical loss analysis and upward pricing 
pressure, the vertical arithmetic offers no magical solutions, but it can be useful in 
focusing the competitive analysis on particular questions and issues. 
Consider then a steel manufacturer A that is proposing to acquire its supplier of 
iron ore, as in Figure 2.  Assume that “steel” constitutes an antitrust product market; if 
the two firms both produced, say, “cold rolled steel”, we would want to examine 
competition and foreclosure issues in that narrower potential product market instead or 
in addition to the broader one. 
                                                     
6 An interesting application was the analysis by Ofcom, the UK communications regulator, of the 
incentives of the British Sky Broadcasting Group to deny access to premium channels to its downstream 
competitors such as Virgin Media.  For the Ofcom analysis, see especially 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40451/annex8.pdf; for the Sky responses see 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/36616/1_sky.pdf and 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/50925/10_sky_annex_7.pdf.   Application in a 
case brought by the FCC, the US communications regulator, regarding similar issues in the proposed 
Comcast/NBCU merger is discussed in Baker (2011) and Baker, et al. (2011). 
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Figure 2.  A vertical merger 
Let M1 equal the percentage profit margin earned by the iron ore company in its 
sales to steel manufacturers A and B (we assume equal margins for sales to the two 
customers) and M2 equal the percentage profit margin earned by steel manufacturers A 
and B in their sales to their own customers (also assumed equal across the two firms).  
Next we introduce IB, the sales of iron ore to steel manufacturer B – A’s rival – and DBA, a 
downstream diversion ratio, the share of any sales of steel lost by steel manufacturer B 
that is recovered by steel manufacturer A (i.e., that would be recovered by the newly 
integrated firm after the merger). 
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Now consider the incentives of the newly integrated firm A in dealing with its 
steel manufacturer rival B.  If the integrated firm refuses to supply iron ore to steel 
manufacturer B, it loses IBM1, its variable profits on those sales.  However, from any 
steel sales diverted from the disadvantaged firm B to integrated firm A it gains DBAIB(M1 
+ M2), the variable profits both upstream and downstream of the increased steel sales 
by A. 
If DBA = 0 – if the none of the lost steel sales of firm B are recaptured by firm A –  
then the only result of A’s decision to deny access to iron ore to B is the loss of IBM1 – 
clearly an unprofitable strategy.  On the other hand, if DBA = 1 – if all of the lost steel 
sales of firm B are recaptured by firm A – then the integrated firm would gain IBM2 from 
its decision to deny access to iron ore to B – clearly a profitable strategy.  The breakeven 
point for the integrated firm’s decision to deny access to its non-integrated rival is the 
point where DBA = M1/(M1 + M2) – if A gains less than this fraction of B’s lost sales, 
foreclosure is unprofitable in this example. 
The importance of the variable margins at the two stages of production is quickly 
apparent.  If the iron ore firm has been earning a very large margin on its sales to steel 
manufacturers – if M1 is high, especially relative to M2 – then a vertical foreclosure 
strategy looks unlikely:  the diversion ratio DBA would have to be very high to make such 
a strategy work, ceteris paribus.  On the other hand, if the steel manufacturer A earns a 
very large margin on its sales to steel customers – if M2 is high, especially relative to M1 
– then a vertical foreclosure strategy looks more likely:  even a small DBA can make the 
strategy work. 
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So we are back to the importance of a familiar pair of figures:  margins and a 
diversion ratio.  We discussed both the usefulness and imperfections of measured firm 
margins in the previous section.  As in that section, we next face the question of how to 
estimate the diversion ratio – again, in this case, the share of steel sales lost by steel 
manufacturer B that would be recaptured by its competitor steel manufacturer A. 
As with the discussion of the use of diversion ratios in the analysis of upward 
pricing pressure, a first, default approximation is to use the firms’ shares of the sales of 
steel.  Maintaining the assumption that steel constitutes a product market, if firm A has 
50 percent of the market and firm B 20 percent, then a first approximation of the 
diversion ratio of sales from B to A would be 50/(100 – 20) = .625.  We could then, as 
earlier, discount this figure by the percentage of B sales that might leave the steel 
market entirely were B to cease being a supplier – likely a small number. 
At that point we would consider other factors that might render A’s market 
share either an over- or an underestimate of this diversion ratio.  If A’s current capacity 
utilization in steel manufacturing is very high, it might not be able profitably to take over 
much of B’s sales.  If other rival steel manufacturers have plenty of excess capacity, they 
might be more aggressive in taking the diverted sales themselves.  (Of course, we should 
also consider the possibility that the integrated firm would foreclose their iron ore 
supplies.)  Similarly, there may be steel imports that are not currently in the market but 
could potentially be available to B. 
The investigation of these types of questions may inform the analyst’s estimate 
of the relevant diversion ratio.  Then this estimated ratio may be combined with the two 
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margin estimates to reach a more informed analysis as to the potential of 
anticompetitive input foreclosure from the vertical merger. 
Finally, we should emphasize that the vertical arithmetic, like critical loss analysis 
and upward pricing pressure, does not answer all questions.  Perhaps most importantly, 
we have not considered the possibility that foreclosure might not only disadvantage B 
and advantage A but also lead to a rise in the price of the downstream good, steel; the 
analysis presented above is thus conservative in its evaluation of the incentives for the 
merged firm to engage in foreclosure (Baker, et al., 2011; Moresi and Salop, 2013)  We 
have not considered the possibility that other current or potential suppliers of iron ore 
might step in to supply B, thus rendering a foreclosure strategy ineffective in harming B 
in the first place.  (This reminds us of the broader point that vertical mergers are likely 
to be harmful to competition only in the presence of significant market power at both 
levels.)  We have also not considered the likelihood that there are other, more refined 
anticompetitive strategies available to the vertically integrated firm than the rather 
crude instrument of absolute input foreclosure (Moresi and Salop, 2013). The vertical 
arithmetic outlined in this paper is only one of many tools that the analyst employs in 
assessing  foreclosure incentives and effects.   
Still, the vertical arithmetic, like critical loss analysis and upward pricing 
pressure, is an investigative tool that has come into widespread use in the enforcement 
of competition law as a result of its usefulness in isolating certain important issues to be 
addressed and questions to be answered.  The enforcement agency analyst who is adept 
at using these tools will be well prepared not only for his or her opportunity to educate 
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decision makers, tribunals, and courts as to the most important issues and questions 
regarding an investigation, but also for the presentations and arguments of the 
companies and their attorneys and economic consultants who come before the agency 
to urge their own point of view. 
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